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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAws-ToRT-LEX LocI OR LEX DoMICILII To DETERMINE
INTERSPOUSAL CAPACITY To SuE?-Husband and wife, Wisconsin domiciliaries, were involved in an automobile accident in Illinois. W brought
suit in Wisconsin against H's insurer for alleged injuries resulting from
the accident. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Illinois law was applicable and did not give one spouse a cause of action
against the other for tort. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
held, reversed, one judge dissenting. The Illinois Married Women's Act1
should be strictly construed as destroying only the remedy in the Illinois
courts, but not the substantive right to relief; hence, the Wisconsin court
may entertain the suit under Illinois law. Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mutual
Ins. Co., (Wis. 1958) 92 N.W. (2d) 759.
The prevailing position of the United States courts is that the rights
of litigants are determined by the substantive law of the place of the tort.2
And the question of interspousal immunity from or capacity to bring suit
generally has been held to be substantive in character and hence to fall
within the lex loci rule.3 In fact, Wisconsin took the lead in establishing
this pattern in Buckeye v. Buckeye-! on facts substantially the same as in
the principal case. The court in the principal case, however, only nominally applied the lex loci rule by construing Illinois law in a manner which
licensed it to apply the law of Wisconsin (lex domicilii) to the question of
interspousal capacity to bring suit.5 Apparently the court was impressed
with the need for a different rule in cases where the out-of-state tort
strongly affects public policy in the state of domicile. This is consonant
with the criticism of the rigid majority rule by writers 6 and two recent
cases7 which argue that the policy factors underlying the position for (or

1 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 68, §1: " . . . neither husband nor wife may sue the other
for a tort to the person committed during coverture. . . ." As amended by act approved
June 24, 1953. Ill. Laws (1953) p. 437. See note 13 infra.
2 CONFLICT OF LAWS R.llsTATEMENT §§378, 379 (1934).
3 Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931), notes, 31 CoL. L. REv. 884
(1931), 44 HARv. L. REv. 1138 (1931), 29 MICH. L. REv. 1072 (1931), 79 UNIV. PA. L. REv.
804 (1931); Garlin v. Garlin, 260 Wis. 187, 50 N.W. (2d) 373 (1951); Howard v. Howard,
200 N.C. 574, · 158 S.E. 101 (1931); Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 S. 414 (1931);
contra: Pittman v. Deiter, IO Pa. D.&:.C. (2d) 360 (1957), note, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 79 (1957).
Cf. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. (2d) 421, 289 P. (2d) 218 (1955).
4 Buckeye v. Buckeye, note 3 supra, is most often cited for this rule although Howard
v. Howard, note 3 supra, and Dawson v. Dawson, note 3 supra, were decided in the same
year and helped set the pattern.
5 See notes 12, 13, 14 infra, and accompanying text.
6 Ford, "Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement," 15 UNIV. PITT. L. REv. 397 at 426 (1954);
COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 250 (1942); note, 4 WAYNE L.
REv. 79 at 80 (1957); 22 A.L.R. (2d) 1248 at 1249 (1952).
7 Pittman v. Deiter, note 3 supra. Cf. Emery v. Emery, note 3 supra.
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against) allowing interspousal suits are of greater importance to the domiciliary state than to the fortuitous place of tort. The two factors commonly
considered are the possibility of fraud on the insurer by interspousal collusion and the need to preserve domestic harmony by prohibiting interspousal suits.8 Yet it would appear that if collusion presents a real problem
it is primarily a matter of interest to the state where the insurance is
issued9 or to the insurer, which may avoid such suits itself by exceptions
written into the policy.10 The maintenance of domestic tranquility involves
the rights, duties, .disabilities and immunities incurred by the family relationship and thus is primarily a matter of domestic relations law rather
than of tort law.11 Clearly the state of domicile is the only state having a
permanent interest in this family relationship of the parties; and the domestic harmony of the family will be more effectively preserved by determining their status according to the law where they reside, rather than
a foreign law. But even though the court in the principal case reaches
this favorable result, its approach seems questionable in terms of its construction of the Illinois statute.. By its reliance on the lex loci rule, the
court failed to reach the desirable result of establishing the lex domicilii
rule as the determinant of interspousal capacity to sue. The court bases
its decision primarily on the Illinois case of Brandt v. Keller12 which construed the Illinois Married Women's Act (prior to the 1953 amendment)
as abrogating a husband's common law immunity from tort suit by his
spouse. It reasons that although Illinois amended this act to prevent a
recurrence of the Brandt result, the amendment merely destroyed any
remedy in Illinois courts,13 but did not restore the substantive immunity
from· suit afforded the spouse at common law.14 "\,Vhile the distinction between procedural and substantive rights in the area of conflict of laws is
often quite nebulous, still the weight of authority indicates that the capacity to bring suit involves a substantive right. 15 Hence, the principal
s Ford, "Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws:
Law and Reason Versus the iR.estatement," 15 UNIV. Prrr. L. REv. 397 at 400-401 (1954).
9 See note, 42 VA. L. REv. 219 at 220 (1956).
10 Pittman v. Deiter, note 3 supra.
11 See note 7 supra.
12 413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E. (2d) 729 (1953).
13 Principal case at 762. Since the original statute was recognized as having assured
a a.use of action in a wife against her husband for tort, the amendment could reasonably
have been read as prohibiting any such suit. See note I supra. This interpretation of
Illinois law as it now stands caused the court to consider its decision in Buckeye v.
Buckeye, note 3 supra, as no longer correct.
14 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC iRELATIONS 221 (1931) cites the following to
illustrate the nature of the husband's immunity from a tort suit by his spouse: "There
is not only no civil remedy, -but there is no civil right, during coverture, to be redressed
at any time. There is, therefore, nothing to be suspended." And at 220: "No cause of
action arose at all in favor of the wife, and it followed that she could not even after a
divorce, sue him for a tort committed during coverture."
15 "We are dealing with a substantive right. . . . The creation and extent of liability
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case is disturbing in that it represents the effectuation of a desirable social
policy by a misapplication of the lex loci rule. The court, recognizing the
need for a different rule, could once again have established the pattern
in this area by separating the tort problem from the domestic relations
problem and then applying the lex loci rule to the former and the lex
domicilii rule to the latter.
E. Roger Frisch, S.Ed.

in tort are fixed by the lex loci delicti commissi. . . . The law of that state creates,
defines and limits her right of action. As she could not maintain this cause of action in
that state, she cannot maintain it here." Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278 at 282,
113 A. (2d) 509 (1955); Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438 at 442, 46 N.E. (2d) 509 (1943).

